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Abstract: This article provides an agent-based model of a hypothetical standalone electricity network
to identify how the feed-in tariffs and the installed capacity of wind power, calculated in percentage of
total system demand, affect the electricity consumption from renewables. It includes the mechanism
of electricity pricing on the Day Ahead Market (DAM) and the Imbalance Market (IM). The extra
production volumes of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources (RES-E) and the flexibility of
electrical consumption of industries is provided as reserves on the IM. Five thousand simulations
were run by using the agent-based model to gather data that were then fit in linear regression models.
This helped to quantify the effect of feed-in tariffs and installed capacity of wind power on the
consumption from renewable energy and market prices. The consumption from renewable sources,
expressed as percentage of total system consumption, increased by 8.17% for every 10% increase in
installed capacity of wind power. The sharpest increase in renewable energy consumption is observed
when a feed-in tariff of 0.04 €/kWh is provided to the wind farm owners, resulting in an average
increase of 9.1% and 5.1% in the consumption from renewable sources while the maximum installed
capacity of wind power is 35% and 100%, respectively. The regression model for the annualized
DAM prices showed an increase by 0.01 €cents/kWh in the DAM prices for every 10% increase in
the installed wind power capacity. With every increase of 0.01 €/kWh in the value of feed-in tariffs,
the mean DAM price is lowered as compared to the previous value of the feed-in tariff. DAM prices
only decrease with increasing installed wind capacity when a feed-in tariff of 0.04 €/kWh is provided.
This is observed because all wind power being traded on DAM at a very cheap price. Hence, no
volume of electricity is being stored for availability on IM. The regression models for predicting IM
prices show that, with every 10% increase in installed capacity of wind power, the annualized IM
price decreases by 0.031 and 0.34 €cents/kWh, when installed capacity of wind power is between 0
and 25%, and between 25 and 100%, respectively. The models also showed that, until the maximum
installed capacity of wind power is less than 25%, the IM prices increase when the value of feed-in
tariff is 0.01 and 0.04 €/kWh, but decrease for a feed-in tariff of 0.02 and 0.03 €/kWh. When installed
capacity of wind power is between 25 and 100%, increasing feed-in tariffs to the value of 0.03 €/kWh
result in lowering the mean IM price. However, at 0.04 €/kWh, the mean IM price is higher, showing
the effect of no storage reserves being available on IM and more expensive reserves being engaged on
the IM. The study concludes that the effect of increasing installed capacity of wind power is more
significant on increasing consumption of renewable energy and decreasing the DAM and IM prices
than the effect of feed-in tariffs. However, the effect of increasing values of both factors on the profit
of RES-E producers with storage facilities is not positive, pointing to the need for customized rules
and incentives to encourage their market participation and investment in storage facilities.
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1. Introduction
In 2017, with 17% contribution of renewables in the total energy needs, the EU was well on the
way to achieve the 2020 target of 20% renewables [1]. As the EU Renewable Energy Directive aims
to increase this number to 32% in 2030 [2], considerable investments and infrastructural changes are
needed in the European member states to accommodate renewables in the energy mix. In 2018, 26.7
billion Euros were spent alone on wind energy projects, of which 16.4 billion was spent solely on
onshore wind energy [3].
Different market integration schemes and support mechanisms have been developed for increasing
the injection of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources (RES-E) in the grid and to restrict the
costs induced by the variability and limited predictability of RES-E generation. In liberalized power
markets, these costs occur as imbalance costs, which may be defined as a penalty for deviating from the
submitted production and consumption plan [4]. In extreme cases, the unpredictable RES-E that are
protected from the market effects by different financial incentives, like the tradable green certificates
and the feed-in tariffs contribute to causing a negative market price [4–6]. Investment grants, RES-E
quotas, feed-in-tariffs, green certificates, etc. also generate incentives to invest, which indirectly increase
competition and improve technology leading to cost reductions and volume growth [7]. Eventually,
the RES-E push the expensive systems like nuclear and gas fired power plants out of the market and
lower the market price due to their negligible marginal costs. However, this increases price volatility
on the market. Extremely high prices are caused when demand peaks as compared to the supply.
Traditionally, established technologies of power production, e.g., coal-fired, gas-fired or nuclear
power plants, were used to provide the needed ancillary services to the grid, maintaining a safe
operation. However, since renewables have successfully entered the electricity market, the need for
system security has increased. It is estimated that, for every 8 MW of wind power installed, a 1 MW of
peaking plant is required [8], whereas, it is also estimated that most of the peaking gas units today
operate at below 20% utilization rates [9]. Use of demand side response (DSR) as a grid balancing
strategy is a recent phenomenon [10], but it shows promising potential, especially when coupled with
increased wind power injection [11]. DSR is a set of measures that uses loads, local generation, and
storage to support network operations and also to enhance the quality of power supply [12]. DSR
has been proven to reduce the needed conventional generation capacity, to maximize the low carbon
generation, to contribute to short-term system balancing and to defer the network reinforcements [13].
This article studies the effect of limited generational flexibility of the wind farms that receive a feed-in
tariff for each kWh of renewable power they inject in the grid, against the reserves provided by the
industries and other technologies as flexible demand.
Electricity grid and markets are composed of multiple actors, who are engaged in
consumption/production of electricity that fulfill their own needs and businesses. Their interactions
via the market and the electricity grid results in impacting the consumption/production pattern of
each other. Agent-based modelling allows to mimic the behavior of human beings and simulate
production, consumption and bidding processes, in which participants are modeled as adaptive agents
with different strategies [14]. Agent-Based Models (ABMs) have been used to model the diffusion of
energy efficient technologies through the society by the interaction of different agents [15,16]. ABMs
are used to explore possible states of a system to understand plausible futures, trends, tendencies, and
behaviors that can occur under specific circumstances [17].
Previous work on the use of ABMs for electricity grids, markets, and the injection of renewables
have focused on the effect of prosumption and peer to peer supply and its effect on the grid
management [18] and grid design strategies [19]. ABMs have also been used to predict price of energy
trading in smart grids by the use of incomplete information by different agents to optimize their
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own utility [20]. Likewise, they have been employed as an e-laboratory to test different regulatory
interventions before implementation [21]. Furthering the investigation on the profit RES-E producers,
ABM has been used to study the optimum conditions for the wind power producers participating in a
deregulated market with the inclusion of learning algorithms to optimize the bidding process [14].
Similarly, the technique has been employed to investigate the effect of storage possibilities in the form
of electric vehicles on the profit of wind farms that engage in the electricity markets [22]. Based on
the above-mentioned examples of application of ABMs for decision-making, technology diffusion,
and market price calculation, the data for analysis were generated by an ABM that was developed
specifically for this study.
1.1. Electricity Markets and Grid Balancing
Energy system flexibility is not a technological issue alone; it has a strong link to the energy
markets as well [23]. Balancing the potential supply and demand of electricity at any given time
ensures a reliable supply of electricity. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are entrusted to carry
out the necessary security checks and real-time operations of ensuring a smooth supply of electricity to
the consumers [6]. To make this possible, the majority of electricity trade is conducted up to one day
before delivery. Based on the time dimension, energy trade is divided into different markets in Europe.
In this article, a Day Ahead Market (DAM) and an Imbalance Market (IM) are modeled based on the
principles of the same markets in Belgium [24,25]. To ensure more transparent market pricing system,
in both markets, buyers and sellers trade electricity following an energy exchange. For the DAM, the
intersection of scheduled production and consumption profiles provide the market prices for each
hour of the next day, as shown in Figure 1a. The RES-E technologies have the lowest marginal costs as
compared to the other technologies and hence are the first ones in the order. The effect of RES pushes
the supply curve to the right, and this is shown in Figure 1b.
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Figure 1. Theoretical merit order without (a) and with renewable energy from wind (b) (P = price of
electricity, Q = installed capacity shown as ratio to the average system demand).
The potential forecasts for demand can be faulty and may still cause imbalances in real time,
coupled with increased unpredictability due to increased injection of wind power resulting in higher
demand for reserves [20]. IM or the balancing market represents the market where the trade of
deviations from the scheduled market positions is dealt with [21]. A real-time balancing market is
particularly useful for RES-E as they can provide higher forecast reliability closer to real time [6]. Due
to the very fast response times required to balance this market and the co nected security i sues, this
market is c ordinated by the TSO [ 2]. Conventionally, TSOs contract minimum reserve from firm
capacity, r ith technology that can be asily ramped up and down to balance th grid.
Recently, regardless of the source technology, reserves are being contracted by the TSOs. Together,
these reserves form the activation price ladder that is s own in Figure 2. The terminology, cheap,
mid-priced, and expensive, refers to how much the TSO will have to pay for the reserves in case of
grid imbalance.
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1.2. Hypothesis Formulation
Feed-in tariffs have proven to be superior for wind power promotion in countries like Denmark,
Germany, and Spain [26,27], as cited by [28], but such a system does not force the RES-E producers to
operate cost efficiently [28]. Although the subsidies for RES-E producers are slowly being phased out,
the question is if the subsidies are negatively affecting the unharnessed potential of DSR as a means to
accommodate RES-E in the existing electricity network.
This is especially relevant for countries, like Belgium, where old and outdated nuclear or fossil fuel
power plants are scheduled to be decommissioned. In the period of 2020–2025, 5000 MW of nuclear
energy is scheduled to be phased-out when seven nuclear reactors will be shut down in Belgium [29].
If the phase-out is carried through, it is speculated that Belgium’s carbon footprint will deteriorate, as
the firm capacity will need to be replaced by fossil-based power plants. However, if Belgium replaces
non-renewable power technologies with RES-E technologies, the effects on the grid balancing and
market prices will be significant.
Currently, a feed-in tariff of 0.04 €/k h is given to Belgian RES-E producers for every k h of
wind energy injected into the grid [30] while the installed wind capacity accounts for 13.2% of the
total installed power capacity [31]. Using Belgium’s example, we assessed varying levels of feed-in
tariffs (τ) (0.01, 0.02, 0.03 and 0.04 €/kWh) for their effect on the consumption of renewable energy from
the grid. Likewise, the effect of increasing the installed capacity of wind farms (∆x) is tested to observe
which of the two factors; τ or ∆x, has a higher impact on increasing injection of wind energy in the
grid. Although the example of Belgium is quoted here to design the experiments, our aim is to gain a
principle mechanistic understanding in a virtual lab approach rather than analyze a specific case study.
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The financial incentives for the RES-E producers are designed in a way to shift the additional cost
to all ratepayers connected to the grid (commons)—hence, the more customers shift to responding to
RE supply, the less the amount that is paid by the commons [32]. To mimic this behavior, industries
are modeled to participate in the IM by providing reserves in the form of flexible demand, at three
levels of reserve prices—cheap, mid-priced, and expensive. The energy intensive industries have been
assessed for their high potential of DSR in the works of [11,33]. This affects the system in a way that
the actions of RES-E producers and flexible consumers benefit the whole system by driving the price of
electricity low. All consumers benefit from lower electricity prices and not just the providers of demand
flexibility; the benefits of demand response can be considered to be truly societal in nature [32,34].
The assumptions explained above lead to the two hypotheses of the study; first, financial incentives
coupled with high capacity of wind power production result in higher consumption from RES-E;
second, these factors result in low electricity market prices.
The rest of the article is written to first present the model methodology following the ODD +
D (Overview, Design concepts, Details + human Decision-making) protocol [35]. The next section
gives the statistical analysis of the simulations and provides linear regression models that define the
system outcomes based on the effect of feed-in tariffs and installed capacity of wind power. Results are
followed by a discussion of the main findings of the article. In the last section, main conclusions are
drawn based on the ABM to generate data for testing the hypotheses.
2. Methodology
This chapter first details the methodology behind the ABM that was prepared to run the simulations
and then describes the statistical analysis that helped in testing the hypotheses by using the data
generated by the model.
2.1. Developing the ABM
Netlogo (6.0.2, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA) [36] was used for modelling the
electricity grid for this paper. ODD + D protocol is followed to ensure comprehensiveness when
reporting ABMs as it ensures that the description of the main theories and underlying assumptions in
the model are clearly explained [35,37]. In this section, the parts of ODD + D that are included consist
of Purpose; Entities, state variables and scales; Process overview and scheduling. The sections on
Design concepts; Initialization; Input data; and sub-models are provided in Appendix A.
2.1.1. Purpose
The model has been designed for generating data to test the hypotheses that increased τ, increased
∆x and demand flexibility from industries result in more inclusion of renewable power in the grid and
lowered market prices.
2.1.2. Entities, State Variables and Scales
The electricity grid modeled in this paper consists of three main agent groups; the electricity
producers that are the wind farms, the large electricity consumers that are the industries, and the Small
and Medium sized Consumers (SMCs) that are the households and small businesses. All of the agents
are connected to the grid, which is operated by a grid operator, who ensures that the grid frequency is
kept stable by reducing the mismatch between the supply and demand to zero. This system needs an
efficient information and communication technology support. However, the technical details of the
smart grid are beyond the scope of this article.
The model runs with quarter hourly time steps over a period of one year. The electricity grid
is modeled as an island (thus, imbalance is zero), where the connections to markets or production
systems outside of the model do not exist. The system parameters and the state variables are provided
in Table 1. The parameters and variables that are agent dependent are detailed in Appendix A (see
Table A1).
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Literature supports that fewer actors providing flexibility increases the likelihood of power they
can exercise in defining the market price [38]. To avoid this, it was also assumed that the size or
capacity of the actors does not limit their ability to participation in either of the two markets. The
properties of the agents are further described in the section below.
a. RES-E producers (2 groups)
The large RES-E producers are modeled as onshore wind farms, with each turbine of an average
capacity of 2 ± 0.4 MW and an average rotor diameter of 80 ± 20 m and a Levelized Cost Of Electricity
(LCOE) of 0.053 €/kWh (for year 2017) [39]. LCOE is defined as the cost to produce 1 MWh of electricity
with a given technology is the sum of the annualized investment costs, the fuel costs, the operational
and management costs and the carbon costs [40].
The on-shore wind farms were selected over the offshore ones because their LCOE is comparable to
the other technologies modeled in the ABM [39]. All RES-E producers can sell the produced electricity
to the electricity markets. The profit of the RES-E producers is a function of subsidy, operating cost,
and the market price in a particular moment. The market for selling electricity is chosen based on the
difference between the nominated supply and actual supply. If the actual supply is less than or equal to
the nominated supply, DAM price is used for profit calculation. However, if the actual supply is more
than the nominated supply, the extra production is placed on the IM and the IM price is considered for
profit calculation, if their provided reserves are engaged on IM. At the start of the model run, all RES-E
producers are randomly assigned a production strategy, which divides them into two strategic groups:
1. Non-storing producers: RE producers who do not own storage but in cases of grid imbalance can
curtail their production.
2. Storing producers: Storing RES-E producers who can store electricity when the actual supply
exceeds nominated supply. They provide the stored electricity and the available storage capacity
as reserves on the IM.
b. Large industries (4 groups)
The large consumers are grouped under the category of industries. All the industries are modeled
to produce one unit of product per kWh of electricity consumed. The price of one unit of product
is assumed to be 1€. Each industry has a smart metering system; hence, information of their own
nominated and the actual consumption is available to all industries in real time. Each of the industries
has a maximum capacity of 50% flexibility in their electricity consumption. However, they are divided
into four groups, three provide reserves on the IM, while the fourth group does not. The bidding prices
for each group are hypothesized and are based on the relative LCOE of other technologies that are
included in the study, so that the bidding price of the most expensive reserve is not above the most
expensive technology (modeled as an electrolyzer) and the price of the cheapest reserves is lower than
the LCOE of wind (without subsidy). The groups are labelled as following based on their strategies:
• Group 0—non-flex: Industries that do not engage in the IM.
• Group 1—cheap reserves: industries that provide reserves at a symmetric price of 0.04 €/kWh.
• Group 2—mid-priced reserves: industries that provide reserves at a symmetric price of 0.08
€/kWh.
• Group 3—expensive reserves: industries that provide reserves at a symmetric price of 0.14 €/kWh.
c. Small or medium sized consumers (SMCs) (2 groups)
The households make up this agent group. They are defined by an average electricity consumption
of 12 ± 1 kWh/day, which is the average consumption of a European household [41]. The consumption
pattern of SMCs depends on the time of the day. Each agent in this group is charged with a bill at
the end of the year for the amount of electricity that they consume. Half of the consumers also have
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Photovoltaic (PV) panels and are hence termed prosumers. The electricity produced by prosumers is
first used to meet own demand and the extra is placed on the grid. However, if there is no demand
for this electricity, the grid operator can decide to cut the injection of electricity from prosumers. The
prosumers do not receive the profit for injecting electricity in the grid because it is assumed that the
cost of smart meters and the grid operational costs will balance the profit that the prosumers may gain.
In the model, this electricity is placed by the TSO on the DAM with a price of 0.08 €/kWh, which is the
LCOE of a PV [42]. The prosumers pay a fee for getting access to the grid. In Flanders (Belgium), it is
an annual flat fee of 85 €, which is also used in this model to calculate the bill of the prosumers [43]. In
the model, the SMCs fall into following two categories based on their strategies:
1. Prosumers: SMCs with PV panels,
2. Consumers: SMCs without PV panels.
All SMCs receive the bill at the end of the year, which is calculated by considering the annual
average price of both electricity markets. In case of the prosumer, the self-consumption is billed as 0.
d. Electricity markets
There are two market environments modeled; DAM and IM. In the ABM, all technologies that
participate in the market are ranked according to their LCOEs.
An inflexible base load (abbreviated as fixed-prod) is assumed to provide 20% of the average
system consumption at an LCOE of 0.02 €/kWh, comparable to the cost of a hydro power plant in
Europe [44]. 10% of the average system consumption is provided by the flexible or interruptible gas
fired power plant (NG plant) at a cost of 0.04 €/kWh [40]. The renewable energy capacity from the
RES-E producers (RES-wind) is modeled to match at least 25% and at maximum a 100% of the average
demand of the system. Half of the SMCs are also modeled to own PV panels, the capacity of which as
determined to meet the SMC’s own average demand per annum. The electricity that is put on the grid
by the SMCs is termed as RES-solar.
On the DAM, the consumers and producers nominate consumption and production capacity,
respectively, for the next 24 h. The match between the supply and demand defines 24 values of the
market price on the next day. This is done based on the merit order of cheaper to expensive technologies
that are engaged to provide the supply. In case of limited supply and a DAM price higher than 0.1
€/kWh, it is assumed that a backup technology (R-tech) is used to provide the necessary electricity and
ensures that the market price does not rise further and the system remains stable. The price of buying
electricity from the backup technology is a constant 0.1 €/ kWh. Since consumption defines how much
supply will be engaged and never the other way around, the price of DAM never drops below the
price of the cheapest technology. It also ensures that the DAM price never rises above 0.1 €/kWh. The
merit order of these technologies from the cheapest to the most expensive is shown in Figure 3.
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Increasing levels of RES-wind capacity and RES-solar are expected to stabilize the DAM price at a
lower value. However, in the case of low demand, this increased production capacity may lead to a
surge in the injection and would require to be settled in the IM. The IM is a quarter hourly market and
hence operates to balance mismatch between supply and demand at a time scale of fifteen minutes.
The default value for IM price is 0 €/kWh, unless the demand or supply deviate from their day ahead
nominations, causing an imbalance. The former triggers a downward activation, which means that the
reserves are requested to decrease consumption or an upward activation from the RES-E producers is
required. The agents who engage in the IM are the industries who provide reserves and the RES-E
producers. The other technologies in IM consist of a flexible Natural Gas (NG) fired power plant with
a bid price of 0.04 €/kWh, and an electrolyzer with a symmetric bid price of 0.2 €/kWh. The merit order
of these reserves is provided in Figure 4.
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Table 1. Parameters and state variables. 
 Definition Values Unit 
Parameters (Do Not Change during the Simulation Runs) 
∁௣௩ LCOE 
1 of photovoltaic panels calculated over 20 years 
period [42]. 
0.088 €/kWh 
∁௪௜௡ௗ LCOE of wind turbines calculated over a time period of 20 years [42] 0.053 €/kWh 
߬ feed-in tariffs given to RES-E 2 producers based on data 
from Belgium 
0–0.04 €/kWh 
∆௫ total production capacity of wind farms as a ratio of average system consumption. x represents the ratio 0–100 % 
i re 4. i la er f r reser es acti ati , it t a fee -i tariff f r i far s.
i f r t f t age ts, t l
fl
i it and money betwe n the agents i governed by different variables that again define the stat
of the agents, technologies, and the marke environments. While Table 1 provides the information for
the technologies and the market environment, th detailed information about the agents can be found
in the annex (see Table A1).
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Table 1. Parameters and state variables.
Definition Values Unit
Parameters (Do Not Change during the Simulation Runs)
Cpv LCOE 1 of photovoltaic panels calculated over 20 years period [42]. 0.088 €/kWh
Cwind LCOE of wind turbines calculated over a time period of 20 years [42] 0.053 €/kWh
τ feed-in tariffs given to RES-E 2 producers based on data from Belgium 0–0.04 €/kWh
∆x
total production capacity of wind farms as a ratio of average system
consumption. x represents the ratio
0–100 %
wind average wind velocity in Belgium [45] 4 m/s
Ctech
price of electricity bought and sold to the backup technology that can
balance the grid imbalances and is engaged a day ahead of actual
supply.
The hypothetical value of 0.1 €/kWh is considered because this is higher
than the LCOE of photovoltaic panels but still comparable to LCOE of
biogas power plants [40]
0.1 €/kWh
∆cheap sum of capacity provided by the cheap reserves kWh
∆medium sum of capacity provided by the mid-priced reserves kWh
∆expen sum of capacity provided by the expensive reserves kWh
βelectro
symmetric bidding price of electrolyzer. Depending on the country the
price may vary [46] 0.2 €/kWh
βwind bidding price of RES-E from wind farms 0.06 €/kWh
βstore
bidding price for the electricity provided or consumed by battery
storage of wind farm owners 0.18 €/kWh
∆in f lex capacity of inflexible power production system
20% of average
demand kW
∆tech capacity of the back-up system ∞ kW
Cin f lex LCOE of inflexible hydro power production system 0.02 €/kWh
∆NG
sum of capacity provided by the flexible natural gas plant that
participates in DAM 3
10% of average
demand kW
CNG LCOE of the flexible natural gas fired power plant [40] 0.04 €/kWh
State variables (may change in every time step)
wpred predicted wind intensity at that quarter on the next day 0–1 range
spred predicted solar irradiation at that quarter on the next day 0–1 range
DAM.Spred predicted and engaged supply to meet the demand on DAM kWh
DAM.Dpred predicted demand from the system on DAM kWh
RES.wpred total predicted production from the wind farms kWh
RES.spred total predicted production from prosumers kWh
RES.wact total production from the wind farms in real time kWh
DAM.Sact supply in real time before balancing kWh
DAM.Dact demand in real time before balancing kWh
CDAM day ahead market price of electricity −0.15–0.15 €/kWh
wact wind intensity in real-time 0–1 range
sact solar irradiation in real-time 0–1 range
RES.sact total production from the prosumers in real time kWh
RES.wIM
production from wind farms that has been made available to balance
the grid at βwind
kWh
RES.wstore
production from storing agents that has been made available to balance
the grid at βstore
Rwind ratio of the RES-wind-act that is needed for activation on IM %
Rtech capacity activated from the backup technology for balancing DAM kWh








CIM imbalance market price −0.2–0.2 €/kWh
QRE% percentage of the total yearly demand of the system met by RES-E 0–100 %
1: Levelized Cost of Electricity; 2: Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources; 3: Day Ahead Market; 4:
Imbalance Market.
For the data on wind velocity and solar irradiation, the database of Belgian Electricity Transmission
System Operator, Elia was used [47]. The data on wind velocity and solar irradiation are not meant
to depict the exact values but create a realistic pattern of wind speed and solar irradiation in a year
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for Belgium. More information on how these data were acquired and how the wind power and solar
power are calculated is provided in the annex.
2.1.3. Process Overview and Scheduling
The sequence of actions for the model is depicted in Figure 5.
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3. Actual consumption and production in every quarter,
4. Calculating the system imbalance to decide to engage the IM,
5. Based on the imbalance, setting the IM price for every 15 min,
6. Updating the system variables,
7. Calculating profit,
8. Storing the unitary profit producers at the end of every month,
9. Storing the unitary bill of SMCs and industries at the end of every month,
10. Changing behavior based on the comparison of unitary bill and unitary profit with other agents
in the past three months,
11. At the end of the year, calculate the bill for SMCs.
2.2. Statistical Analysis
The two main variables in this study that were varied to test their effect on the whole system
are feed-in tariffs (τ), and the installed capacity of wind power as a ratio of the average demand of
the whole system (∆x). Both variables are treated as continuous variables with ranges of 0 to 0.04
for τ and a range of 0 to 1.00 for ∆x. Three response variables were observed in the analyses; QRE%
(percentage of system demand met by RES-E), CDAM.annum (the annualized DAM price) and CIM.annum
(the annualized IM price). The ABM was used to run 5000 simulations to generate data that were then
fitted with linear regression models using the statistical program R [48]. All statistical tests were two
sided and had a significance level of 0.05%.
3. Results
3.1. Effect on the RES-E Consumption
Figure 6 shows the mean RES-E consumption for all scenarios which is noted to increase sharply
following the increase in ∆x until the installed capacity reaches 35% after which the slope becomes less
steep. To explain the effect of τ and ∆x on QRE%, the data were fitted with a linear regression model
(Equation (1)).
Q̂RE% = 8.178+ 54.958(∆x) − 0.185(τ0.01) + 0.173(τ0.02) + 1.063(τ0.03)+
2.373(τ0.04) + 0.0806(∆x.τ0.01) − 0.728(∆x.τ0.02) − 0.476(∆x.τ0.03)+
11.333(∆x.τ0.04).
(1)
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The linear model for QRE% explains 95% of the variations in the observed percentage of system
consumption from renewable sources with a residual standard error of 4.16%. The curvature in the
predictions for QRE% is not explained solely by the above linear equation. Hence, the data were divided
into two sections with ∆x < 35% and ∆x ≥ 35% for further explanation. This resulted in two regression
models, which are depicted by the Equations (2) and (3). The regression model (Equation (2)) explains
88% of the variations in QRE%, with a residual standard error of 3.14% (1740 degrees of freedom). While
the second model (Equation (3)) explains 83% of the variation in QRE% with a residual standard error
of 4.266% (3240 degrees of freedom). See Appendix B (Table A2) for the more detailed information on
the parameter estimates for the regression models. The fitted trend line for each value of τ for each
regression model is shown in Figure 6:
When ∆x < 35%,
Q̂RE% = 3.315+ 77.813(∆x) − 0.374(τ0.01) − 0.285(τ0.02) + 0.562(τ0.03)+
0.424(τ0.04) + 1.846(∆x.τ0.01) + 2.328(∆x.τ0.02) + 2.710(∆x.τ0.03) + 20.180(∆x.τ0.04),
(2)
When 35% ≤ ∆x ≤ 100%,
Q̂RE% = 15.701+ 44.560(∆x) − 0.646(τ0.01) + 0.118(τ0.02) + 1.134(τ0.03)+
5.742(τ0.04) + 0.670(∆x.τ0.01) − 0.700(∆x.τ0.02) − 0.618(∆x.τ0.03) + 6.697(∆x.τ0.04). (3)
When the maximum ∆x is less than 35%, the increase of every 10% in ∆x in the absence of any
feed-in tariffs will result in an increase of 7.7% in QRE%. The regression lines (t0.01, t0.02, t0.03, and
t0.04) show the effect of feed-in tariffs (Figure 6). When ∆x is increased by 10%, it results in 3.4, 5.0, 6.5,
and 9.1% increase in QRE%, until ∆x reaches 35%. Equation (3) shows a less steep slope in predictions
for QRE% as ∆x increases from 35% to 100%. It shows that, in the absence of feed-in tariffs when ∆x
increases by 10%, it results in an increase of 4.4% in QRE%. In addition, the effect of feed-in tariffs at
0.01, 0.02, 0.03, and 0.04 €/kWh results in a respective increase of 4.5, 4.3, 4.3, and 5.1% in QRE% for
every 10% increase in the value of ∆x until it reaches 100%. This analysis shows that the increase in ∆x
is the main factor that affects the increase in QRE% as compared to increasing values of τ.
Conclusively, the statistical analysis shows that there is not enough evidence to reject that there is
no significant effect of τ and the ∆x on the consumption of renewable energy (p-value < 2 × 10−16).
In fact, both factors result in increasing the consumption from RES-E, with the most rapid increase
observed when feed-in tariffs for RES-E producers are provided at a value of 0.04 €/kWh while the
installed capacity of wind power is between 0 and 35%.
3.2. Effect on the Market Prices
The two market prices dictate the profits of the industries and the producers and the bill for the
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for each value of τ are shown in Figure 7a, while the linear model from where these trend lines are
acquired is given in Equation (4). See Appendix B (Table A2) for the more detailed information on the
parameter estimates for the regression model.
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When the data observed for annual DAM prices were fitted in a linear regression model (Equation
(4)), it showed significant effect of τ and ∆x. The regression model for DAM prices explains 97% of the
variation in the annualized DAM prices with a residual standard error of 0.0006169 (4990 degrees of
freedom). See Appendix B (Table A2) for the more detailed information on the parameter estimates
for the regression model. The regression model predicts that, under the sole effect of increasing ∆x,
the annualized DAM prices will increase by 0.01 €cents/kWh for every 10% of increase in ∆x. From
the four trend lines in Figure 7a, it is derived that, for 10% of increase in ∆x and fe d-in tariffs at 0.01,
0.02, and 0.03 €/kWh, a respective increase of 0.09, 0.06, and 0.03 €cents/kWh can be expected in the
mean annualized DAM price—while a feed-in tariff of 0.04 €/kWh provided to the RES-E producers
can result in a decrease of 0.0007 €/kWh in the mean annualized DAM price with every 10% of increase
in ∆x until it reaches 100%:
̂E[CDAM.annum] = 0.002+ 0.001(∆x) − 0.0006(τ0.01) − 0.001(τ0.02) − 0.001(τ0.03)−
0.0002(τ0.04) − 0.003(∆x.τ0.01) − 0.006(∆x.τ0.02) − 0.010(∆x.τ0.03) − 0.013(∆x.τ0.04).
(4)
The data for annualized IM prices shown in Figure 7b show an increase in the IM prices until
∆x is abov 25%, after which the data show downward trend. Therefore, we divided the data into
two parts and fitted separate gression models t them to explain the pattern that is followed by the
IM prices. The linear regression model in Equation (5) explains the 72% of the variations in the IM
prices when ∆x < 25%, with a residual standard error of 0.001266 (1240 degrees of freedom). Equation
(7) explains 87% of the variations in the IM prices when 25% ≤ ∆x ≤ 100%, with a residual error of
0.003329 (3740 degrees of freedom). See Appendix B (Table A2) for the more detailed information on
the parameter estimates for the regression models:
̂E[CIM.annum] = 0.0062− 0.029(∆x) − 0.0004(τ0.01) − 0.0009(τ0.02)−
0.001(τ0.03) + 0.003(τ0.04) − 0.001(∆x.τ0.01) − 0. 02(∆x.τ0.02) − 0.03(∆x.τ0.03) − 0.009(∆x.τ0.04).
(5)
The trend lines that are added to the graphs are indeed acquired from these main equations. It is
visible in Figure 7b th t t0.01, t0.02, and t0.03 ave an almost equal slope, w r as t0.04 has a steeper
slope in the first part of the graph and a smoother slope in the second part of the graph. Equation
(6) shows that, in the absence of feed-in tariffs, with a 10% increase in ∆x, the annualized IM prices
will increase by 0.03 €cents/kWh. This is due to the fact that, when there is less wind power being
produced, the RES-E producers cannot offer large volumes of power on DAM, resulting in deficit of
supply. Hence, when IM prices also spike, RES-E producers (storing and non-storing) cannot offer
much to balance the grid. This results in more expensive reserves being engaged on IM. In addition,
when the feed-in tariff of 0.01 €/kWh is provided to the RES-E producers, it results in little effect on the
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position of RES-E producers in the bid ladder, and only results in increasing the IM prices by 0.004
€cents/kWh for every 10% increase in ∆x.
For feed-in tariffs of 0.02 and 0.03 €/kWh, the RES-E producers move to a second spot on the merit
order list for DAM. This leaves less reserves from RES-E producers being made available for IM. This
shift of positions in the merit order causes more power being offered as supply (to compensate for the
unpredictable nature of wind). This results in a decrease in IM prices by 0.033 and 0.044 €cents/kWh,
respectively. Furthermore, when feed-in tariff of 0.04 €/kWh is provided to the RES-E producers, it
moves their position to first in the DAM bid ladder. This results in more volumes being made available
for DAM from all RES-E producers. This leaves almost no stored reserves available for the IM, which
results in engaging more expensive reserves and ultimately increasing the IM prices.
When ∆x < 25%,
̂E[CIM.annum] = 0.001+ 0.0031(∆x) − 0.0001(τ0.01) − 0.00005(τ0.02) − 0.0003(τ0.03)
+0.0028(τ0.04) − 0.002(∆x.τ0.01) − 0.006(∆x.τ0.02) − 0.007(∆x.τ0.03) + 0.011(∆x.τ0.04).
(6)
When 25% ≤ ∆x ≤ 100%,
̂E[CIM.annum] = 0.009− 0.034(∆x) − 0.0007(τ0.01) − 0.001(τ0.02) − 0.001(τ0.03)
+0.004(τ0.04) − 0.0005(∆x.τ0.01) − 0.0007(∆x.τ0.02) − 0.002(∆x.τ0.03) + 0.008(∆x.τ0.04).
(7)
This trend in IM price changes once ∆x is increased above 25%. This results in decreasing the
IM prices as ∆x increases, with and without the provision of feed-in tariffs. In the absence of τ, every
10% increase in ∆x results in a decrease of 0.03 €cents/kWh. It is simply an effect of extra volume
of electricity being produced by the RES-E producers when there is no demand. The trend lines in
Figure 7, derived from Equation (7), exhibit that, with every 10% increase in ∆x until it reaches 100%,
the IM price decreases by 0.034, 0.035, 0.036, and 0.026 €cents/kWh, respectively, when feed-in tariffs
are 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, and 0.04 €/kWh. Other than the decrease in IM prices in relation to increasing ∆x,
it is also worth noting that the mean IM prices remain higher when a feed-in tariff of 0.04 €/kWh is
provided to the RES-E producers. This is again an effect of the all electricity volumes being made
available for DAM, leaving no predicted volumes for storage on the next day. This results in, firstly,
too much supply (hence negative IM prices) and, secondly, no stored electricity reserves (hence more
expensive reserves being engaged).
The statistical analyses presented above show that there is not enough evidence to reject the
second hypothesis of the study and there is a significant effect of τ and the ∆x on the two market prices
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The numbers on top of Figure 9a,b show the number of storing and non-storing RES-E producers
at he nd of the simulation runs. It shows that he number of RES-E storing producers is almost
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profitable strategy during the simulation runs. At the start of every simulation run, the number of
RES-producers is modeled to be random with an equal chance of any RES-E producers appointed
storage facilities. This effect could be a result of lower operating costs for the RES-E producers and
hence a higher chance of being engaged on DAM (first position in the bid ladder) and IM (first position
for non-stored electricity and fourth for the stored power).
Finally, the mean unitary bill for households with PV panels and without being in relation with
increasing values of ∆x is shown in Figure 10. Comparison of Figure 10a,b shows that the mean bill of
SMCs follows the same pattern as the market prices. When the mean bill of consumers is separated
according to the ownership of PV panels, it suggests that it is, in fact, not very profitable for households’
own PV panels when the installed capacity of wind energy is above 50% of the average system demand,
as compared to the households without PV panels. There are two factors that cause disparity between
the bill of the prosumers and consumers; first, the amount of consumption of electricity from the grid,
and, second, the effect of the prosumer tariff. The very limited variation in the bill of the prosumers is
a result of their limited reliance on the grid to fulfill their needs, which results in almost no effect of the
market prices on their unitary bill, as compared to the consumers who rely solely on the grid for the
electricity supply.
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4. Discussion
Negative market prices for electricity are a rare phenomenon. In our results, the IM prices fall
below zero with increasing values of ∆x above 25%. In reality, the European energy grid allows the
grid imbalances to be reduced from the different countries, while, in this model, the grid is modeled as
a stand-alone system, hence negative values on IM are observed more frequently than in reality.
From the results, it is obvious that the two market prices are decoupled, where the DAM prices
remain significantly higher than the IM prices. This is a result of how the markets were modeled,
allowing for the wind farm owners to bid their extra capacity on the IM. The authors in [23] mentioned
that, if capacity bids from RES-E are in use on the reserve market, the energy price on reserve markets
may get lower than on the intra-day market, creating distorting incentives. It shows the ability of the
presented ABM to depict the working of the electricity markets.
The decreasing market prices in the simulations as a result of the increasing installed capacity of
wind energy have also been observed in Germany. The authors in [49] have shown that, on the German
market, each additional GWh of RES-E fed to the grid has resulted in lowering the spot market price of
electricity by $1.4–1.7/MWh. The authors in [50] found that the negative prices on the DAM and IM
in Belgium, Germany, and France occur due to low consumption demand and high RE generation
expectation; one of the reasons is the current support mechanisms for solar and wind power [6].
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Conversely, it can be argued that decreasing the feed-in tariffs and increasing the installed capacity
of wind energy may result in deteriorating the profit of the RES-E producers. This only stresses that,
once the subsidies are taken away, there is a need for different rules for the flexible RES-E producers to
support their participation in the market and increase the supply of RES-E.
Developments in the power electronic technologies have made the application of energy storage
systems a possible solution for modern (flexible) power application [51,52]. It also has been shown
that battery-based energy storage with several minutes of run time is optimal for stabilizing wind
generation in weak grids [53]. However, these systems are still not economically viable for the wind
farm producers, as shown in the low profits for the storing agents.
It needs to be mentioned that, since the average of the two market prices is considered for billing
the SMCs, the bills do not reflect reality. In reality, the supplier would nominate the consumption
on the market for the consumers under a contract and the consumers will be billed according to the
mismatch from these nominations. The average bill for the SMCs exhibits an opposite trend to what
was observed in Germany, where the electricity price increased by 30% from the year 2006 to 2012,
while the average household income grew by 6% [54]. To improve the accuracy of the bill for the SMCs,
it will be useful to include the service as well as the grid operation charges in the calculation of the bill.
In the simulation results, the very pronounced effect of feed-in tariffs for the RES-E producers
on the market prices points to the need to include more power production technologies in the model,
which will also reflect reality. One such technology could be dispatchable renewables, such as biomass.
Authors in [55] suggested that, for a power system completely based on renewables, these technologies
can be incentivized to increase flexibility. Whether it is more effective to incentivize wind farm owners
so they can compete with other technologies or rather provide incentives to dispatchable renewables
that can replace the fossil-fuel based systems could be another topic to use the presented ABM.
For businesses, the decision to provide flexibility as a reserve is complex and can result in major
organizational and operational changes. In the model, the industries responded to supply changes
regardless of the time of the day and neither did they consider any lead times; in reality, though, this
is probably not the case. Although the simulations provide insightful results regarding industries’
electrical flexibility as reserves, these results are not extended to other issues. For example, there
are legal issues involved when industries plan to market negative tertiary reserve energy in small
amounts because of tight storage restrictions [56]. Another reason to keep the industries from providing
flexibility as demand response could lie in the relatively low energy price that they pay (as compared
to other costs) and could be mitigated by policies opposite to the ones in practice that subsidize heavy
industries [57]. Other incentives for energy intensive industries to reduce their energy costs lie in their
ability to install combined heat and power plants. The authors in [58] assessed in detail the benefits
for industries to engage in symbiotic relations and utilize waste (biomass) to fuel combined heat and
power plants. One can argue in favor of such practices against consumption flexibility, especially if it
does not incur changes in business as usual.
Finally, the complexity of a flexible electric grid poses a challenge to the diffusion process of
flexibility [59]. Flexibility in consumption and production of power requires a longer time to be
successful and completely diffused as an important component of the social aspect of the power system.
It will require changes in human behavior and institutional setup; both domains with high inertia
towards change [57]. One example of this phenomenon, termed response fatigue, occurs when the
consumers tire of continuously responding to supply (and/or market price) signals. This behavior
was reported in [60], with up to 98% of the residential consumers who participated in a demand
response program. The results of the model point to higher need for flexibility and demand response
from the consumers for the increased injection of RES-E in the grid. If the households are also to be
included as active participants of demand response, there is a need to provide them with awareness
and information on the energy markets, next to the provision of in-home display devices that will
provide them with real-time information on their consumption and market prices [10].
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5. Conclusions
The objective of this article was to model the two electricity markets (day ahead and imbalance
market) by using Agent-based Model (ABM) and assess two hypotheses. The first hypothesis was to
test the effect of increasing feed-in tariffs (τ) and installed capacity of wind energy (∆x) on increasing
the consumption from renewables. The second hypothesis was to check the effect of the same factors
on decreasing the two market prices. This objective was successfully met by using ABM to generate
the data that were then fit into linear regression models to reach conclusions on the hypotheses.
The study concludes that, with increasing ∆x by 10%, the consumption from RES-E increases by
7.8% in the absence of τ, until ∆x reaches a maximum of 35%. At different levels of τ, the increasing
consumption from RES-E increases differently. The most pronounced is when τ is set at the value of
0.04 €/kWh and the maximum ∆x is 35%. For ∆x higher than 35% and less than 100%, the increase
in RES-E follows a less sharper increase and once again the sharpest increase is for τ = 0.04 €/kWh,
which under every 10% increase in ∆x results in a 5.1% increase in RES-E consumption.
To test the hypothesis about the market prices, different regression models were fit to explain the
Day Ahead Market (DAM) and Imbalance Market (IM) prices. DAM prices increase by 0.01 €cents/kWh
for every 10% increase in ∆x in the absence of τ. With increasing ∆x when τ is provided at 0.01, 0.02
and 0.03 €/kWh, the increase in the DAM prices is less sharp. In addition, with every increase in the
value of τ, the mean DAM price is lowered as compared to the previous value of τ. When the value of
τ is 0.04 €/kWh, it results in decreasing DAM prices as ∆x increases. The increasing values of τ enable
RES-E producers to nominate more power on the DAM at lower marginal costs, thus lowering the
overall DAM prices. At 0.04 €/kWh, the effect of τ is two-fold because, at this level, the storing RES-E
producers can also nominate stored electricity on the DAM, while still being cost competitive. Hence,
more electricity is nominated for DAM and electricity prices are lowered as a result.
The regression model to explain the trend observed in the IM prices had to be split into two further
models. Briefly reported, the regression models show that, in the absence of τ, every 10% increase in
∆x results in a decrease in IM price by 0.031 and 0.34 €cents/kWh when ∆x is between 0 and 25% and
between 25% and 100%, respectively. The models also showed that, until the maximum ∆x is less than
25%, the IM prices increase for the values of τ at 0.01 and 0.04 €/kWh, but decrease for τ of 0.02 and
0.03 €/kWh. When ∆x is between 25% to 100%, increasing the values of τ until 0.03 €/kWh result in
lowering the mean IM price. However, at 0.04 €/kWh, the mean IM price is higher, showing the effect
of no storage reserves being available on IM and more expensive reserves being engaged on the IM.
Conclusively, increasing values of τ and ∆x increase the consumption of renewable energy and
decreases the market prices; with the effect of ∆x being more significant than the effect of τ. However,
the effect of increasing values of both factors on the profit of storing RES-E producers is not positive,
pointing to the need for customized rules and incentives to encourage their market participation and
investment in storage facilities. The results support that, in the future, with more RES-E producers,
different market rules may apply to the flexible RES-E and conventional generation [23].
Introducing flexibility in the power grid as a response of more renewable energy is a challenging
task, as it requires institutional shift to a new way of production and consumption of electricity.
Changes in consumer behavior will be crucial to this shift, which adds to the complexity of this
inevitable undertaking. The approach of agent-based modelling can substantially contribute to the
study of electricity production and consumption behavior, while contributing to a just distribution
of costs and benefits between the different economic actors. It is worth mentioning that, though
the technical details of the model for each agent can be refined to yield more insightful results, the
presented ABM is capable of carrying out a detailed study of cost–benefit distribution between different
agents in a grid solely fed by renewable power.
The results support that the RES-E agents do not have enough incentive to operate more efficiently
when feed-in tariffs are being provided to them. There need to be other support mechanisms that
promote investment in storage facilities for the RES-E producers. Market mechanisms that dictate fines
for deviating from nominated power can further demotivate actors in the power generation business
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to switch to renewable energy technologies. The market mechanisms need to evolve to let more RES-E
producers participate. Additionally, the demand side response will aid this transition. As more local
balancing agents (aggregators) enter the power networks and virtual power plants are becoming a
reality, smart metering would replace net metering systems. This will provide an opportunity to the
consumers of all sizes to be flexible in response to production and market signals, ultimately resulting
in a truly flexible grid. Depending on the specific markets and their respective mechanisms in different
countries, it is up to the policy makers to incentivize the consumers to change, hence create a market
pull for RES-E producers, and/or incentivize the RES-E producers to create a market push for change in
the consumer behavior. Finally, although Belgian wind and solar profiles were used for the simulations,
the observations from the model are transferrable to other countries where policy makers wish to
incentivize renewable power.
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Appendix A. Methodology
Table A1. Variables and parameters for the different agents.
Definition Values Unit
Small and medium sized consumers
Agent properties (do not change during the simulation runs)
αSMC consumption capacity of a household [41] 0.125 kWh
∆PV capacity of a photovoltaic panel [41] 1–2 kWh
Agent Variables (may change in every time step)
αpred predicted consumption for one quarter of an hour on the next day
αact actual consumption in real time
random.factor a number generated every quarter of an hour to introduce randomnessin the consumption profile of the consumers 0.01–0.05
QPV production from the photovoltaic panels in real time
αsel f−cons consumption from own PV panel (only for prosumers)
QSMC
production from the PV-panels in real time that is planned for the
DAM.Spred
bill bill for the whole past year €
billunit per unit cost of electricity consumed in the past year €/kWh
Industry
Agent properties (do not change during the simulation runs)
αind average consumption of an industry 2000 (±400) kWh
group
group number defining the strategy of the industry
Group 0: bid-cap of 0 kW
Group 1, 2, and 3: bid-cap of 50% of αind
0–3
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Table A1. Cont.
Definition Values Unit
Agent variables (may change in every time step)
αpred predicted consumption for one quarter of an hour on the next day
αact actual consumption in real time
αbid
for group 0, αbid = 0
for group 1, αbid = ∆bid∆ Rcheap
for group 2, αbid = ∆bid∆ Rmedium
for group 3, αbid = ∆bid ∆Rexpen
αIM
for group 0, αIM = αact − αpred
for group 1,2, and 3, αIM = αbid
αtot total consumption in the past month kWh
∆bid bidding capacity (flexible demand) 50% of αind kW
bill bill for the past month €
P instantaneous profit in every time step €
Punit unitary profit for the past month €/kWh
RES-E Producers
Agent properties (do not change during the simulation runs)
∆prod average production capacity of a wind farm 4000 (±100) kW
∆storage average storage capacity 20% of ∆prod kW
Ccur costs for curtailing [61] 0.022 €/kWh
Cst LCOE 1 of battery storage [62] 0.176 €/kWh
strategy
strategy defining if the producer will have storage or not
If 0, there is no storage facility
If 1, there is storage facility
0 or 1
Agent variables (may change in every time step)
∆req(D+1) Required production per agent to meet the system demand kWh
Qnom nominated power production for the next day kWh
Qprod actual power production in real time kWh
Qact part or all of the Qprod made available for the system kWh
Qcurt curtailed power kWh
Qstored(t) stored power in real time kWh
QDAM production sold at the DAM 2, always ≤ Qnom kWh
Qbid production bid at the IM 3 kWh
QIM
production sold at the IM
If, Rwind > 0
QIM = Rwind ∗ Qbid
kWh
Qtot QDAM + QIM +QIM.st kWh
Qsum total production traded in the markets in the past month kWh
QIM.st
storage reserve engaged by IM. Value is positive when batteries are
discharged, and negative when batteries are charged kWh
P instantaneous profit in every time step €
Punit unitary profit for the past month €/kWh
1: Levelized Cost of Electricity; 2: Day Ahead Market; 3: Imbalance Market.
Appendix A.1. Sub-Models
Appendix A.1.1. Prediction of Consumption and Production
The model process begins on day = 0 and tick = 0, which depicts the hour 00:00 of a day. For the
first quarter of an hour (one time step), the industries and SMCs predict consumption for the same
quarter on the next day. The prosumers from the SMCs also predict the production from the PV panels,
as QPV depending on the capacity of their solar panels (∆PV). The producers calculate their production
(Qprod) based on the weather predictions for that quarter on the next day. For all RES-E producers,
Qprod is calculated as a product of their capacity (∆prod) and the predicted weather (wpred).
Based on the strategy of the RES-E producer, the predicted production varies. For non-storing
agents, it is equal to their Qprod, while, for storing agents, ∆req(D+1) and Qpred.stored define Qnom,
where Qpred.stored is the expected power production that will be stored, given that Qpred.stored does not
exceed ∆storage. Hence, the Qnom is based on Equations (A1) or (A3), and the value for Qpred.stored(t+1) is
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based on Equations (A2), (A4), or (A5). The conditions that define which equation is chosen for setting
the values are explained below:
If ∆req(D+1) ≥ Qprod + Qpred.stored(t), then
Qnom = Qprod +Qpred.stored(t), (A1)
Qpred.stored(t+1) = 0. (A2)
If ∆req(D+1) < Qprod + Qpred.stored(t), then
Qnom = ∆req(D+1). (A3)
If ∆storage ≥ Qprod + Qpred.stored(t) − Qnom
Qpred.stored(t+1) = Qprod +Qpred.stored(t) − Qnom. (A4)
Otherwise,
Qpred.stored(t+1) = ∆storage. (A5)
Appendix A.1.2. Setting the Day Ahead Market Price
DAM price is calculated by a merit order economic dispatch procedure. First, the total predicted





then matched with the available supply from different technologies arranged in order of increasing
bid price.
The technology prices in ascending order are: Cin f lex, CNG, βwind, Cpv, Ctech.
Once the supply volume is matched to the demand, the total predicted supply can be calculated
as:
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Since this process sets a price for every quarter, it is not representative of the DAM price. Hence,
at the end of every four ticks (four quarters), the values of the last four DAM prices are averaged and
one market price for the one whole hour is set. In this way on the next day, there are 24 DAM prices for
each hour of the day.
Appendix A.1.3. Actual Consumption and Production
Once day 1 begins, the industries consume electricity according to the time of the day and the day
of the week and their strategy. The SMCs consume electricity based on their respective profile and
according to the time of the day, week of the month, and season.
For all SMCs, there consumption is a product of their predicted consumption (αpred) and a
random factor.
For consumers, αact is the same as αcons
For prosumers
If αcons ≥ QPV
QSMC = 0, (A8)
αsel f−cons = |QPV − αcons|, (A9)
αact = αcons − QPV. (A10)
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If αcons ≤ QPV
αsel f−cons = αcons, (A11)
QSMC = QPV − αsel f−cons, (A12)
αact = 0. (A13)
The consumption from all SMCs and industries (
∑n.SMC+n.ind
i=1 αact) sets the value for DAM.Dact
The RES-E producers produce electricity according to the weather conditions, and their production
is calculated based on their respective strategy.
For non-storing producers, they nominate production volumes first on the DAM, based on their
knowledge of the expected consumption. In the model, this knowledge was substituted by using the
total consumption demand of the system as an indicator for the expected demand. Which volumes
will be offered on DAM and what will be offered to the IM are calculated as follows:
If Qact − Qnom ≥ 0
QDAM = Qnom, (A14)
Qbid = Qact − QDAM. (A15)
If Qact − Qnom < 0
QDAM = Qact, (A16)
Qbid = 0 (A17)
for storing producers
If Qact − Qnom ≥ 0 and ∆storage − Qstored(t−1) ≥ Qact − Qnom,
QDAM = Qnom, (A18)
Qbid = 0, (A19)
Qstored(t) = Qact − Qnom + Qstored(t−1). (A20)
If Qact − Qnom ≥ 0 and ∆storage − Qstored(t−1) < Qact − Qnom,
QDAM = Qnom, (A21)
Qstored(t) = ∆storage, (A22)
Qbid = Qstored(t) +Qact − QDAM. (A23)
If Qact − Qnom < 0 and Qstored(t−1) ≤ Qact − Qnom,
QDAM = Qnom, (A24)
Qbid = 0, (A25)
Qstored(t) = Qstored(t−1) − (QDAM − Qact). (A26)
If Qact − Qnom < 0 and Qstored(t−1) > Qact − Qnom
QDAM = Qact + Qstored(t−1), (A27)
Qstored(t) = 0, (A28)
Qbid = 0. (A29)
The Qbid from all RES-E producers (
∑n.prod
i=1 Qbid) provide the wind energy available for balancing
the grid (RES.wIM).
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It has to be mentioned that the storing producers provide Qstored(t) to the grid balancing, the sum
of which defines the whole stored electricity reserve (RES.wstore).
Whether that reserve, or part of it, is engaged, (QIM−st)will be declared in the following sub-model.
Likewise, if the reserves are not engaged and the RES-E producers do not have the capacity to store the
extra production or they do not own storage, then the extra production will be curtailed, setting the
value for Qcurt.
The sum of production from all RES-E producers (
∑n.prod
i=1 Qact) defines the value for RES.wact The
sum of production from all prosumers (
∑n.SMC
i=1 QSMC) provides the value for RES.sact.
At the end of this step, the supply from the technologies engaged on the previous day is calculated:
DAM.Sact = ∆in f lex + (RNG ·∆NG) + RES.wact + RES.sact. (A30)
Appendix A.1.4. Setting the Imbalance Market Price
Due to weather variations, there is a slight difference between the prediction and actual production,
in addition, since the SMCs do not own smart meters, their actual consumption does not coincide with
their predicted consumption at all times. Additionally, the inflexible industries (Group 0) also do not
always respect the nominated demand. This leads to imbalances in the volumes of electricity being fed
into the grid and the electricity that is taken-off, setting a non-zero value for IMimb When IMimb , 0,
the extra demand (IM.Dact) is adjusted to meet the supply and supply (IM.Sact) is adjusted to meet the
demand, which results in providing values for the following equations:
IM.Dact = DAM.Dact + ∆cheap·Rcheap + ∆medium·Rmedium + ∆expen·Rexpen + ∆store·Rstore +Qelec, (A31)
IM.Sact = DAM.Sact + RES.wact·Rwind + RES.wstore·Rstore + Qelec. (A32)
If the value of IMimb is positive, then the reserves on the right side of Figure A1 are activated,
while, if the value is negative, then the reserves on the left side of the figure are activated. The
price is set by the most expensive reserve that is engaged to balance the grid, in the ascending order
of βwind, βcheap, βmedium, βexpen, βstore, βelectro.Energies 2019, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 25 of 34 
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of this step, the reserves that were engaged are declared and each corresponding agent calculates its
profit based on these values.
Appendix A.1.5. Calculating Profit for Industries and RES-E Producers
Producers’ profit is calculated based on which market is used to trade electricity, the bidding
price, subsidy level, and curtailed amount of electricity. If the metered volume is less than or equal
to the nominated power, then DAM price is used for profit calculation. In the other case, the extra
production is priced according to IM price only if it is engaged to balance the grid. If the surplus could
not be balanced, then the profit is decreased as the cost for curtailing is considered in the equation.
For producers with storage, the same procedure is followed for profit calculation, except for stored
electrical energy that is used to balance the grid, also increases the costs because of the high LCOE of
stored electricity.
For all RES-E producers:
If Qbid is 0, then values of QIM and Qcurt are set to be 0 as well.
If Rwind and Qbid are more than 0, then QIM is set as the product of Qbid and Rwind. In addition, the
value for Qcurt is then set at 0.
If Rwind is 0 but Qbid is more than 0, then the value of QIM is set to 0 and the Qbid is set as the value
for Qcurt.
For storing agents:
If Rstore , 0, the value for QIM−st is the product of Qstored(t) and Rstore. What is left from stored
electricity after assigning the QIM−st is the new value of stored electricity (Qstored(t+1)).
The profit for the storing agents is calculated as
Pprod = QDAM·CDAM +QIM·(βwind − τ) +
∣∣∣QIM−st· βstore∣∣∣− [Qtot · {(Cwind − τ) + (Ccur·Qcurt)}]. (A33)
The profit for the non-storing agents is calculated as
Pprod = QDAM·CDAM +QIM · (βwind − τ) − [Qtot · {(Cwind − τ) + (Ccur·Qcurt)}]. (A34)
The total profit gets updated in every time step until, at the end of the month (Ptot), it is divided
by the total production in the past month and the profit/kWh of electricity produced is obtained, Punit.
The profit for the industries is the remainder of the profit from production of the industrial product
and the electricity bill. The profit from the industrial product and electricity consumption is modeled
at 1:1. The bill is calculated based on the consumption of electricity and which market the electricity is
traded on.
For industries that do not engage in IM, if the consumption is lower than the nominated
consumption, then DAM price is assigned as electricity cost; otherwise, the IM price is considered
as cost. For industries, which engage in IM, the actual consumption is modeled to always match
the nominated one. If the reserves are engaged on IM, then, depending on upward activation or
downward activation, the consumption is recalculated. The profit is then calculated as follows:
For Group 0,
if actual consumption (αact) is more than predicted consumption (αpred), then the extra consumption
is assigned as the consumption from IM (αIM). Otherwise, the consumption from IM is set at 0.
The profit for Group 0 is calculated as
P = (αDAM + αIM) − {(αDAM ·CDAM)+(αIM·CIM)}. (A35)
For Groups 1, 2, and 3, the consumption from IM is the product of their respective bidding capacity
(∆bid) and the multiplicative factor (Rcheap or Rmedium or Rexpen). This multiplicative factor is calculated
on a pro rata basis for all agents that provide reserves on the same price.
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The profit for Groups 1, 2, and 3 is respectively calculated as follows:
P = (αDAM + αIM) +
∣∣∣∣αIM· βcheap/medium/expen∣∣∣∣− αDAM·CDAM. (A36)
The total profit gets updated in every time step until, at the end of the month, it is divided by the
total consumption in the past month and the unitary profit (€/kWh) (Punit) is obtained.
Appendix A.1.6. Updating the System Variables
In every time step, the predicted values of wind (wpred) and solar irradiation (spred) are updated
and set for the next quarter to be used for the prediction of consumption and production on the next
day. In addition, the values for wind (wact) and solar irradiation (sact) in real time are set to be used for
grid balancing and IM.
The value of DAM price (CDAM) that was set on the day before is recalled from the memory and
used for the quarter in real time. In addition, IM price (CIM) for the past quarter is declared and stored
for all agents to calculate their respective profit or bill. The value of the total system consumption is
updated (Qsystem); in addition, the variable for the total consumption from the renewables (QRE) is
recalculated and stored.
Appendix A.1.7. Changing Strategies
At the end of the month after receiving their respective bills, each agent is randomly paired up
with any other agent of the same group. They share the values of Punit and strategy. In four months,
the unitary profit (Punit) of each agent is summed and averaged so it can be compared to the collected
four values of Punit from the paired agent.
After four months, the agent compares its own averaged profit against the four values collected
from the randomly paired agents against its own averaged unitary profit over the past four months. If
the agent has the highest profit as compared to the paired agents, it keeps its own strategy. However, if
its own profit is not the highest, then there is a probability of 50% that it will adopt the strategy of the
paired agent with the highest profit.
Appendix A.1.8. Calculating Bill for the SMCs
At the end of the year, in the last time step of the simulation, the bill for the SMCs is calculated
based on the annually averaged value of CDAM and CIM and the total consumption in the year.
For the prosumers, self-consumption is not billed; however, a flat fee of 85 €/kW is charged





αact ·(CDAM.annum + CIM.annum)/2 (A37)




unitary bill (€/kWh) is calculated by dividing the total bill by the total consumption (bill/αtot).
Appendix A.2. Design Concepts
1. Basic principles
The model is built on the hypothesis that subsidies given to producers of RE cause negative
market prices and result in adoption of less flexible consumption practices by the consumers and a
lack of incentive for RES-E producers to invest in storage and curtailment mechanisms.
The behavior of industries and producers is modeled to represent bounded rationality based on
the availability of information about own profit. All the agents make decisions that maximize their
own benefit. It is also assumed that all agents gather information once a month about the unitary profit
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(€/kWh) from a randomly selected agent of their own group and, after three months, the agents make a
decision with a probability of 50% to adopt the strategy that results in the maximum profit against the
electricity produced or consumed.
The market prices included in this model only represent the energy content of the electricity that
is traded. In reality, the physical electricity component of the consumers’ bill is between 25–30% of
the total bill, while 60–75% of the bill consists taxes, grid fees, transmission and distribution service
charges, etc.
2. Emergence
A pattern is expected to emerge in the system due to the effect of adopting the strategies by the
agents. For example, if most of the industries choose to provide cheap reserves on the IM, the whole
system has a lower IM price. This will result in lowering the profit of the storing producers who may
not get to be engaged in the IM; it will also lower the bill of the SMCs. In addition, it will decrease the
costs for all industries in the system.
3. Adaptation
The RES-E producers adapt to the τ scheme and the market prices by adopting the more profitable
strategy, to either buy storage, or only rely on curtailment whenever they produce more than the
nominated power. The industries adapt to the effect of the strategy on their profit by choosing either to
be part of the IM or not and what to price to bid for their reserves.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to assess the effect of adaptation of the agents by using a
Paired Samples Wilcoxon Test (non-parametric). The only variables that were tested for sensitivity to
adaptation of agents; QRE% (percentage of system demand met by RES-E), CDAM.annum (the annualized
DAM price), and CIM.annum (the annualized IM price). These are the same variables that are assessed
for variation under the effect of τ and ∆x. The results indicated that there is a significant difference in
values of QRE% when the adaptation is turned on vs. when there is no adaptation (p-value 5.421 ×
10−13). The values of CDAM.annum and CIM.annum do not show any significant difference between the
two sets of simulation results (p-values 0.1058 and 0.5518, respectively).
4. Objectives
The objective of producers and industries is to maximize their own benefit either by increasing
the profit gained by selling electricity or by buying cheap electricity.
5. Learning
No individual or collective learning is included in the model.
6. Prediction
The producers use weather predictions to predict the power produced on the next day. Industries
schedule their consumption for the next day based on time of the day.
7. Sensing
The producers and prosumers make use of the available weather information and predict their
production. In case of τ, the producers calculate their profit by factoring them in. The industries and
SMCs calculate their bill based on the market prices. When there is surplus (deficit) production, the
agents respond by providing upward reserves on the IM.
8. Interaction
Direct interaction between every two agents of the same category takes place at the end of every
month, when they share their unitary cost or profit with each other. Indirect interaction occurs between
all agents in the grid due to their connectivity to the grid and the reliance of their profit on the market
price that is calculated by pooling all the demand and production. Hence, the individual decisions of
the agents not only affect their own profit or bill but also of all other agents connected to the grid.
9. Stochasticity
The interactions between the agents take place by random chance. At the end of every month,
each agent is paired with another agent of the same group, and they exchange information about the
unit cost of electricity consumed or produced.
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The wind profile, ranging between 0 and 1, was generated by dividing the total consumption
of wind power in Belgium by the population in the year 2018 and multiplying it with two random
values generated around 4.0 m/s (the mean wind speed in Belgium) to introduce randomness in each
quarter hour to depict the uncertainty of wind speed. Two values are generated because the producers
are assumed to be located in two different locations. This assumption helps in causing extreme
events in the simulations. The randomness factor is introduced for calculating both the prediction
and actual production; hence, there is always a chance of slight difference between prediction and
actual production.
The data for solar radiation are generated based on the time of the day and the season of the year,
and a randomness factor is introduced to depict the unpredictability of weather, and, hence, there is
always a chance of a slight difference between the predicted production and actual production by the
prosumers. The consumption pattern of industries and SMCs is generated by taking into account the
time of the day and the day of the week, whether it is a working day or a weekend. The consumption of
SMCs also has randomness included in the actual production to include unpredictability of consumption
by agents who have no access to information about their predictions and actual consumption.
10. Collectives
Collectives have been defined under the heading of entities, state variables, and scales.
11. bservation
All of the observations are collected for every quarter hour. When it is the observations that
change every month or every three months, the values remain the same for every quarter up to the
point that the agents change their strategy and the value changes. The observations collected from the
model are:
1. Number of industries,
2. Number of RES-E producers,
3. Averaged unitary profit of RES-E producers,
4. Averaged unitary profit of industries,
5. Averaged unitary bill of consumers,
6. Averaged unitary bill of prosumers,
7. Annual DAM price,
8. Annual IM price,
9. Percentage of system consumption from renewables.
Appendix A.3. Initialization
The model is initialized by setting the total number of SMCs (n.SMC) at 4000. This creates two
groups of agents that either have PV panels or not. All SMCs have an average consumption of 0.125
(±0.05) kWh. The total number of industries, n.ind is calculated by dividing n.SMC by 100. The
average consumption (αind) of all industries is set as 2000 (±400) kWh. The industries are randomly
distributed into four groups. The bidding capacities and respective prices for each group have already
been described.
Now, the total required demand of the system, (∆max.req) can be calculated by summing the average
consumption of all the industries and the SMCs.
The level of τ is also selected from a drop-down lis with the options 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, and 0.04
from the interface. In addition, from the interface, the percentage of total system demand (∆x) is
selected from a slider with values between 0 and 100%. This provides the information to set the total
number of RES-E producers by dividing the product of ∆max.req and ∆x by 500. The RES-E producers
are randomly divided into groups. One group is assigned storage. The respective capacities and costs
for each RES-E group have already been described.
For all RES-E producers, 500 MWh is the average production of a wind turbine considered in
the model.
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Then, the capacity of inflexible power production system is 20% of the ∆max.req. Finally, the capacity
of the NG-plant is calculated as 10% of ∆max.req.
Appendix A.4. Input Data
For the data on wind speed, the statistics on wind power production were downloaded from the
website of Belgian Electricity Transmission System Operator, Elia [47]. The data from year 2016 and
2018 were used to calculate the wind speed by using the formula, wind power (kW) = 1/2CpρAV3:
V = Wind speed, m/s,
Cp = 0.59 (theoretical maximum),
ρ = Air density, kg/m3,
A = Rotor swept area, m2 or pi D2/4.
The data on wind speed are not meant to depict the exact values but create a realistic pattern of
wind speed in a year for Belgium. The resulting value of wind speed (wind) is then used in every
time step of the model. However, the value w is multiplied with a random variable with mean 4 m/s
(average wind speed of Belgium), to introduce variation in the wind speeds. This value of w is then
used to calculate the production volume of RES-E producers with the formula defined above. The
formula used in the code is (3.14 × (rotor-dia)2 × wind)/2. The value of rotor-dia has been defined as 80
(±20) m.
The data for solar radiation were also generated in the similar manner. The power production
from PV panels was downloaded from Elia’s website for the year 2018, and the solar radiation (H) was
calculated for each quarter of the year by using the formula, solar power (kW) = A × r × H × PR:
A = area of a solar panel (assumed to be 10 m2 on average),
r = solar panel yield (assumed to be 40%),
Performance Ratio (PR) = 0.75 (default value),
H = average quarter hourly solar radiation (kW/m2).
The acquired value of solar irradiation (solar) is then loaded into the model for every quarter and
solar power is calculated by multiplying this value with the capacity of PV panel of the prosumer. The
PV capacity of each prosumer is set as 1 (±0.100) kW.
The consumption pattern of industries was generated to show the higher consumption during the
weekdays and between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., while a maximum consumption of 30% of
average consumption was modeled for the night hours and weekends. For SMCs, the hours in the
morning between 5:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. and hours in the late afternoon between 3:00 p.m. and 7:00
p.m. were modeled to have the highest consumption. Less to almost no consumption was modeled for
early afternoon, later in the evening, and at night.
Appendix B. Results
Table A2. Parameter estimates for the regression models.
Equation (1) 95% Confidence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [7.6100895, 8.7469286] 0.28994 <2 × 10−16
(∆x) [53.9763258, 55.9404355] 0.50093 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−0.9897179, 0.6180155] 0.41004 0.65039
(τ0.02) [−0.6306872, 0.9770462] 0.41004 0.67279
(τ0.03) [0.2593658, 1.8670992] 0.41004 0.00954
(τ0.04) [1.5699873, 3.1777207] 0.41004 7.5 × 10−9
(∆x.τ0.01) [−1.3081767, 1.4694938] 0.70843 0.90936
(∆x.τ0.02) [−2.1174333, 0.6602372] 0.70843 0.30378
(∆x.τ0.03) [−1.8649325, 0.9127379] 0.70843 0.50159
(∆x.τ0.04) [9.9443263, 12.7219968] 0.70843 <2 × 10−16
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Table A2. Cont.
Equation (2) 95% Confidence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [2.7071620, 3.9960798] 0.3286 <2 × 10−16
(∆x) [74.5869387, 81.0400927] 1.6451 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−1.2862439, 0.5365611] 0.4647 0.420
(τ0.02) [−1.1963856, 0.6264195] 0.4647 0.540
(τ0.03) [−0.348558, 1.4742464] 0.4647 0.226
(τ0.04) [−0.4867967, 1.3360083] 0.4647 0.361
(∆x.τ0.01) [−2.7162018, 6.4099361] 2.3265 0.427
(∆x.τ0.02) [−2.2348564, 6.8912815] 2.3265 0.317
(∆x.τ0.03) [−1.8526038, 7.2735342] 2.3265 0.244
(∆x.τ0.04) [15.6178810, 24.7440189] 2.3265 <2 × 10−16
Equation (3) 95% Confidence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [14.484822, 16.918209] 0.6205 <2 × 10−16
(∆x) [42.828969, 46.291382] 0.8830 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−2.367283, 1.074046] 0.8776 0.461
(τ0.02) [−1.602670, 1.838659] 0.8776 0.893
(τ0.03) [−0.585964, 2.855365] 0.8776 0.196
(τ0.04) [4.022200, 7.463529] 0.8776 6.94 × 10−16
(∆x.τ0.01) [−1.777742, 3.118849] 1.2487 0.591
(∆x.τ0.02) [−3.148456, 1.748135] 1.2487 0.575
(∆x.τ0.03) [−3.067230, 1.829361] 1.2487 0.620
(∆x.τ0.04) [4.248845, 9.145436] 1.2487 8.74 × 10−8
Equation (4) 95% Confidence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [0.0249092567, 0.0250611015] 3.873 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(∆x) [0.0131371212, 0.0133994625] 6.691 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−0.0007381475, −0.0005234065] 5.477 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.02) [−0.0013410582, −0.0011263171] 5.477 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.03) [−0.0020040095, −0.0017892684] 5.477 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.04) [−0.0023555315, −0.0021407904] 5.47 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(∆x.τ0.01) [−0.0035230511, −0.0031520444] 9.462 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(∆x.τ0.02) [−0.0068965095, −0.0065255028] 9.462 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(∆x.τ0.03) [−0.0102137379, −0.0098427312] 9.462 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(∆x.τ0.04) [−0.0141593139, −0.0137883072] 9.462 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
Equation (5) 95% Confidence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [0.0249092567, 0.0250611015] 0.0002107 <2 × 10−16
(∆x) [0.0131371212, 0.0133994625] 0.0003641 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−0.0007381475, −0.0005234065] 0.0002980 0.160095
(τ0.02) [−0.0013410582, −0.0011263171] 0.0002980 0.002045
(τ0.03) [−0.0020040095, −0.0017892684] 0.0002980 0.000215
(τ0.04) [−0.0023555315, −0.0021407904] 0.0002980 <2 × 10−16
(∆x.τ0.01) [−0.0035230511, −0.0031520444] 0.0005149 0.049849
(∆x.τ0.02) [−0.0068965095, −0.0065255028] 0.0005149 3.79 × 10−5
(∆x.τ0.03) [−0.0102137379, −0.0098427312] 0.0005149 1.88 × 10−11
(∆x.τ0.04) [−0.0141593139, −0.0137883072] 0.0005149 <2 × 10−16
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Table A2. Cont.
Equation (6) 95% Confidence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [0.0009089505, 1.518687 × 10−3] 1.554 × 10−4 1.20 × 10−14
(∆x) [0.0009249548, 5.236665 × 10−3] 1.099 × 10−3 0.00513
(τ0.01) [−0.0005317846, 3.305135 × 10−4] 2.198 × 10−4 0.64709
(τ0.02) [−0.0004843669, 3.779311 × 10−4] 2.198 × 10−4 0.80870
(τ0.03) [−0.0007923893, 6.990876 × 10−5] 2.198 × 10−4 0.10048
(τ0.04) [0.0023973214, 3.259619 × 10−3] 2.198 × 10−4 <2 × 10−16
(∆x.τ0.01) [−0.0056389054, 4.587736 × 10−4] 1.554 × 10−3 0.09583
(∆x.τ0.02) [−0.0094620968, −3.364418 × 10−3] 1.554 × 10−3 3.92 × 10−16
(∆x.τ0.03) [−0.0105595729, −4.461894 × 10−43] 1.554 × 10−3 1.51 × 10−6
(∆x.τ0.04) [0.0083587361, 1.445642 × 10−2] 1.554 × 10−3 3.84 × 10−13
Equation (7) 95% Confidence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [0.009186941, 0.0106329549] 0.0003688 <2 × 10−16
(∆x) [−0.035489722, −0.0333098310] 0.0005559 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−0.001799072, 0.0002459000] 0.0005215 0.136548
(τ0.02) [−0.002920207, −0.0008752344] 0.0005215 0.000278
(τ0.03) [−0.002860245, −0.0008152728] 0.0005215 0.000430
(τ0.04) [0.003440509, 0.0054854812] 0.0005215 <2 × 10−16
(∆x.τ0.01) [−0.002047464, 0.0010353664] 0.0007862 0.519831
(∆x.τ0.02) [−0.002286895, 0.0007959363] 0.0007862 0.343084
(∆x.τ0.03) [−0.003969384, −0.0008865529] 0.0007862 0.002028
(∆x.τ0.04) [0.006221606, 0.0093044372] 0.0007862 <2 × 10−16
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